Abstract-This paper provides an empirical investigation into the relationship between uncertainty and ex ante U.S. labor contract durations over the period 1970 to 1995. Using a structural identification of aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks, we find that desired contract durations are shorter during periods of heightened nominal or real uncertainty. This evidence supports the view that labor contract durations respond endogenously to the aggregate uncertainty prevailing at the time they are negotiated, but suggests that risk-sharing concerns are not paramount. The analysis also considers several measures of inflation uncertainty that have appeared in the literature. The results generally corroborate previous findings of an inverse relationship between desired contract durations and the level of inflation uncertainty.
I. Introduction

I
T is widely agreed that labor contracts can have important implications for the behavior of the macroeconomy. Contract length is particularly important for the efficacy of stabilization policies and the dynamic behavior of aggregate fluctuations. For example, labor contracts, by limiting the actions of agents during the duration of the contracts, can provide the monetary authority with an advantage in reacting to shocks in an economy and a role in stabilizing output (Fischer, 1977) . In addition, multiperiod contracts can serve as a key propagation mechanism for shocks, their structure being central to the adjustment process of output, wages, and prices. This latter consideration is crucial to the design and conduct of disinflation policy (Taylor, 1980) . Recent union labor contract renewals have resulted in significantly longer contracts being signed than in the past. For example, the three major auto manufacturers and the United Auto Workers signed 4-year national contracts in their last round of negotiations, breaking a long-standing tradition of 3-year contracts (Bloomberg News, 1999; Hyde, 1999; Phillips & Despeignes, 1999) . The United Steel Workers and Kennecott Copper Corporation signed a 5-year contract in October of 1996 (Thomson, 1996) . A 6-year contract with Goodyear Tire Company was ratified by the United Steel Workers in May of 1997 (Gamboa, 1997) .
These examples illustrate a recent trend in the durations of union labor contracts. Figure 1 shows by year selected percentiles of the distribution of ex ante contract durations for all major union contracts negotiated in that year and included in the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data. 1 Apart from some volatility in the early 1970s, the 10th and 50th percentiles have remained remarkably constant over this period. In contrast, the 25th and 90th percentiles show a steady upward progression starting in the mid-1980s, with the 75th percentile following suit beginning in the early 1990s.
There is a rich theoretical literature on the determinants of desired contract durations, largely based on the framework developed by Gray (1978) (see also Canzoneri, 1980) . In an extension of her earlier work on indexation, Gray argues that contract length should be positively related to transaction costs and inversely related to uncertainty, regardless of whether the uncertainty pertains to nominal or real shocks. Subsequent work suggests that the nature of the uncertainty may matter for the desired contract duration. Danziger (1988) develops an implicit contract model featuring risk-averse workers and risk-neutral firms. Within this framework, contracts permit risk-sharing between parties and allow workers to insure themselves against shocks. As Danziger demonstrates, increased aggregate real uncertainty can result in workers seeking to extend this insurance through longer contracts.
The theoretical literature on contract durations spawned a host of empirical studies aimed at identifying their key determinants. For example, Wallace and Blanco (1991) investigated the response of contract durations to changes in nominal and real uncertainty. In addition, there was considerable interest in analyzing the impact of inflation uncertainty on contract durations. This line of research largely came to a halt in the early 1990s, having failed to reach a consensus.
There are several reasons why a return to this empirical question is worthwhile. First, as noted above, significant changes in contract durations emerged after the end of the sample periods used in the earlier investigations. This additional variation in contact durations may be especially important in identifying the determinants of desired contract durations. Second, developments in estimation techniques now afford a more formal approach for deriving key variables of interest. For example, the advent of more structuralbased procedures allow for better integration of theory into the identification of nominal and real shocks (Blanchard & Quah, 1989; Gali, 1992) .
The primary objective of this paper is to test the competing predictions of the Gray (1978) and Danziger (1988) models regarding the sources of aggregate uncertainty and their effects on contract durations. We explore this issue using a structural identification of aggregate demand and aggregate supply shocks. The results indicate that both nominal and real uncertainty have a significant negative relation to contract durations. This evidence supports the view that labor contract durations are endogenous to the economic environment prevailing at the time they are signed, but that risk-sharing concerns are not paramount.
The analysis also attempts to clarify the empirical relation between contract durations and inflation uncertainty. In particular, we examine several proxies for inflation uncertainty that have appeared in the literature. Although two of the three proxies we consider generate evidence of a significant inverse relation between contract length and inflation uncertainty, this result does not hold in the case of a popular proxy for inflation uncertainty based on a sliding regression technique. We subsequently argue that the methodology used to construct this third proxy may be problematic and that previous inferences based on this measure may be unreliable.
In the next section of the paper, we discuss various measurement issues that arise when dealing with labor contract durations. We also outline the econometric framework we use in our estimation. Section III explores various methodologies that have been proposed in the literature to measure aggregate nominal and real uncertainty as well as inflation uncertainty. The variables used in the estimation are discussed in section IV along with the empirical findings. The paper concludes with a short summary of our findings.
II. Econometric Specification
The next four subsections discuss issues related to the econometric framework used to analyze the determinants of contract durations. These issues are: the measurement of the contract duration, censoring, indexation and scheduled reopenings, and the unbalanced nature of the panel data. The fifth subsection presents our econometric framework.
A. Measuring Contract Durations
The empirical literature has considered two different definitions of the contract duration. Wallace and Blanco (1991) define the contract duration to be the number of months between the prior contract expiration and the current contract expiration (Dur 1 ). The BLS in its publication Current Wage Developments defines the contract duration as the number of months between the contract's effective date and its expiration date (Dur 2 ). This latter definition has been adopted by Christofides and Wilton (1983) , Christofides (1985 Christofides ( , 1990 , Vroman (1989) , and Murphy (1992) .
The theoretical literature stresses the importance of the information available to the bargaining unit (BU) at the time the contract is negotiated. Consequently, testing for the impact of uncertainty on contract durations may require careful attention to the timing of the actual negotiations. This suggests a third definition of the contract duration, which is the number of months between the contract's negotiation date and its expiration date (Dur 3 ). In practice, the negotiation date can precede or follow a contract's effective date (and its prior expiration date). For example, in an early settlement where the BU replaces a contract prior to its expiration (6% of negotiations in our sample), the negotiation date precedes the effective and prior expiration dates. Similarly, in a delayed settlement with backdating of the terms of the agreement (35% of negotiations in our sample), the negotiation date follows the effective date and prior expiration date.
There are two potential consequences of using either of the two existing definitions of the contract duration. First, the dependent variable in the analysis may be mismeasured. Second, there may be a timing mismatch between the uncertainty measure and the contract duration it is trying to explain. The extent of this mismatch depends on the time differences between the prior expiration date, the effective date, and the negotiation date, as well as the degree of time aggregation used in the construction of the uncertainty measure. Most of the prior empirical studies have used data at a quarterly frequency. Table 1 shows the extent of this timing mismatch based on a quarterly frequency for our 
B. Censoring of the Contract Duration
The empirical literature on contract durations has assumed implicitly that the observed contract duration is the same as the desired contract duration. 2 Given the heterogeneity across BUs in the data, this would likely imply a smooth distribution of observed contract durations. Define a timely settlement to be one where the negotiation of the subsequent contract is concluded at the expiration of the current contract. Timely settlements have the feature that all three definitions of the contract duration discussed above are the same. Figure 2 shows a histogram of durations for all timely settlements pooled across the years of our sample. A clear feature of the data is the prominence of contracts that are multiples of 12 months in duration. Of these settlements, 93% involve contract durations that are multiples of 12 months. 3 The most common explanation for this pattern of contract durations is that there is a strong desire by most BUs to conduct their contract renewals during a specific time of the year. This interest (which is outside of the basic economic models under consideration in this paper) imparts an inertia to the decisions of the BUs regarding the current contract duration. Variations in the prevailing uncertainty at the time of the negotiations may generate changes in the desired contract durations, but not in the observed contract durations. That is, the benefits arising from making small adjustments in the contract duration may be outweighed by the costs of departing from the current seasonal timing of the contract renewals.
In addition, when the BU does decide to adjust its contract duration, it is likely to adjust the duration in a way that maintains the current seasonal timing. This can be seen in figure 3 , where we show the first difference in adjacent contract durations, again for the sample of timely settlements. For this sample of contacts, 80% involve no change in the duration. Among the 20% that do change the duration, 74% involve a change of a multiple of a year.
Figures 2 and 3 suggest that the underlying distribution of desired contract durations is censored. Our estimation allows for censoring by assuming that the union and firm use the following simple rounding rule when setting the actual contract duration. If the BU chooses to negotiate only at a particular time of year, then we assume it rounds its desired contract duration up or down to satisfy this constraint in the way that minimizes the absolute deviation between their actual and desired contract duration. For any censored contract duration, this implies that the unobserved desired duration lies in an interval corresponding to the 6 months prior to the observed contract duration and the 6 months subsequent to it.
C. Indexation and Scheduled Contract Reopenings
The desired contract duration may depend on whether the contract contains mechanisms that allow the terms of the contract to adjust to new information that arises within the 2 By desired we mean from the vantage point of the economic model to be tested. 3 We include in this calculation contract durations that are 11, 23, 35, 47, and 59 months, because these are generally the result of a prior expiration date being at the end of a month and the negotiation date being at the beginning of the next month. There is a second mechanism by which the BU can build flexibility into the contract. A contract can specify one or more scheduled reopenings for the purpose of negotiating deferred wage increases. A scheduled reopening differs from an unscheduled reopening. An unscheduled reopening of the contract can occur at any time during the term of the contract with the mutual consent of the firm and the union. An unscheduled reopening requires the firm and the union to negotiate in good faith over all terms and conditions of employment. In contrast, a scheduled reopening occurs at a prespecified date, and only obligates the firm and the union to negotiate in good faith over that specific deferred wage increase. 5 The existing literature has not controlled for the presence of a reopening clause in a contract.
The relative importance of these two forms of contract flexibility for our data is illustrated in Table 2 . Of all the contracts in our sample, 61% do not contain a COLA or a reopening clause. COLA clauses are more prevalent than reopening clauses and appear in 34% of the contracts. Scheduled reopening clauses appear in less than 6% of the contracts. Few contracts (less than 1%) contain both a COLA and a reopening clause.
D. Unbalanced Panel
The data consist of all major contract negotiations followed by the BLS from 1970 to 1995. 6 The BLS data provide a unique identification number for each BU, as well as a variable that tracks each negotiation. Together these two variables provide a panel structure for the data. The time period covered by different BUs can vary over the sample due to either changes in the scope of the coverage of major collective BUs by the BLS, or changes in the size of the BUs.
The nature of the sample implies that the number of contract negotiations we observe for a specific BU is related to the average length of its contracts. For example, a BU that negotiates 3-year contracts can have a maximum of nine observations in the data. In contrast, a BU that negotiates 1-year contracts can have up to twenty-five observations. This leads to an unbalanced panel structure where the length of each panel on average varies inversely with the dependent variable. 7 Table 3 shows the sample frequency, median, and mean contract duration for each panel length in the sample. Allowing each negotiation in our sample to have an equal weight in the estimation would result in overweighting short-duration contracts relative to their importance at any point in time. 8 
E. Econometric Framework
The previous four data considerations can be accommodated in the following econometric framework: 
For reasons of data availability, most of the literature has only included a variable indicating whether a contract contains a cost-of-living adjustment clause. Christofides and Wilton (1983) , Card (1986) , and Christofides (1990) examine the degree of indexation.
5 A minority of reopening clauses are triggered by a prespecified movement in a cost-of-living index, instead of having their date prespecified. These are referred to as COLA reopenings. We lump these together with scheduled reopenings because there are too few of them to analyze separately. 6 The data end in 1995 due to the decision by the BLS to stop collecting data on major union contracts. 7 The correlation between the contract duration and the number of contract negotiations by a BU is Ϫ0.33, which is statistically significant. 8 Weighting each contract equally gives an overall mean duration of 32.8 months. Weighting each BU equally gives an overall mean contract duration of 33.8 months. Sample restricted to the set of contracts used in the estimation.
where C* it is an unobserved index of the desirability of indexing a contract with a COLA, C it is an indicator which takes a value of 1 if the contract has a COLA, R* it is an unobserved index of the desirability of including a reopening clause, R it is an indicator which takes a value of 1 if the contract has a scheduled reopener, and D* it is the desired contract duration. If the contract durations for a particular BU are censored (I i ϭ 1), then we assume the BU rounds the actual durations (D it ) up or down to keep the expiration date fixed at a specific calendar month. We take account of any endogeneity of the COLA and reopening indicators in the specification of the desired contract duration by jointly estimating the COLA, reopening, and duration equations. To simplify the joint estimation of the three-equation system, we adopt the following factor structure for our error terms (see Cameron & Heckman, 2001) :
where j denotes the outcome (COLA, reopener, or duration), i refers to the BU, and t indicates the specific contract. We assume that each is drawn from an independent normal distribution. We further assume that f has a discrete distribution over the interval from 0 to 1. Each BU takes a draw from the f distribution, and this draw affects all of its contract negotiations. The ␣'s reflect the impact of the persistent component of the error term on our outcome measures across contract negotiations within a BU. 9 The likelihood for the sequence of contracts negotiated by the i th BU can be constructed as follows. Conditional on a specific draw of f, the COLA, reopener, and duration outcomes are independent. As a result, the conditional likelihood for the t th contract negotiation for the i th BU takes the form
where
months, and and ⌽ are the standard normal density and cumulative density functions, respectively.
Similarly, given a specific draw of f, the conditional likelihoods across a BU's contracts are independent. If the i th BU has T i contracts, then the conditional likelihood for the sequence of contracts negotiated by this BU is given by
Allowing T i to vary across BUs allows for the unbalanced nature of the panel data. Assuming k points of support of the discrete distribution of f, we can write the unconditional likelihood for the i th BU as
where 0 Ͻ p l Ͻ 1 and ¥ lϭ1 k p l ϭ 1.
III. Measuring Changes in Aggregate Uncertainty over Time
This section outlines the methodologies used to construct time-varying measures of aggregate uncertainty. We initially discuss the measures of nominal and real uncertainty, before turning our attention to three alternative measures of inflation uncertainty.
With regard to the aggregate uncertainty measures, we believe there are two reasons for placing a greater emphasis on the results based on the structural identification of nominal and real shocks. First, this framework has a more direct connection to theory in that it allows us to test the competing predictions of the Gray (1978) and Danziger (1988) models of contract duration. Second, the inclusion of measures of inflation uncertainty in empirical models of contract duration can lead to problems of interpretation. As we show later, inflation uncertainty appears to be positively related to both nominal and real uncertainty. If nominal and real uncertainty exert opposite influences on contract durations due to risk-sharing considerations, then the predicted effect of inflation uncertainty on contract durations is ambiguous. 10 On the other hand, if risk-sharing concerns are not important, then theory predicts that contract durations will be shorter during periods of heightened nominal or real uncertainty. In this case, we would expect to observe an inverse relationship between inflation uncertainty and contract durations. Consequently, it is important to adopt an empirical specification that includes separate roles for nominal and real uncertainty.
A. Nominal Uncertainty, Real Uncertainty, and Structural Vector Autoregressive Models
Almost all theoretical work has postulated that nominal and real uncertainty are important determinants of contract length. Lacking direct observations on aggregate uncertainty, empirical studies on contract durations have adopted various methods to measure (and allow for) shifts in the variance of nominal and real shocks over time. Wallace and Blanco (1991) specify processes for the aggregate money supply and industry-specific price changes, and then reestimate the models sequentially by adding individual observations into the sample. The standard error of the estimate (SEE) from these sliding regressions is then used as a proxy for nominal uncertainty and real uncertainty, respectively. Following this earlier work, Wallace (1999) controls for nominal uncertainty using the identical proxy based on money supply shocks. 11 This proxy for real uncertainty also uses a residual-based estimate of oil price shocks. Though these two papers try to include different types of aggregate uncertainty, a potential drawback of their analysis is that the estimates are based on single variables that may be too narrow in scope to serve as reliable proxies. What is needed, therefore, is an estimation strategy that can be applied to a set of economic variables, and that offers a more appealing scheme for identifying nominal and real shocks.
The structural vector autoregression (SVAR) approach offers one such methodology and uses restrictions based on economic theory to uncover the structural disturbances in an economy. Within the SVAR literature, Gali (1992) has proposed a method that allows for the identification of an aggregate supply (AS) shock and three types of aggregate demand shocks: an IS shock, a money demand (MD) shock, and a money supply (MS) shock. For our investigation into the determinants of contract duration, the Gali (1992) model provides a particularly attractive framework to isolate different sources of uncertainty in the economy. The IS shock, MD shock, and MS shock can be combined into a composite aggregate demand shock to characterize the behavior of nominal disturbances, whereas the AS shock can be interpreted as a real shock.
Following Gali (1992) , we consider the following fourvariable system:
where A(L) is a 4 ϫ 4 matrix of polynomial lags, ⌬y is the growth rate of real output, ⌬i is the change in the yield on 3-month Treasury bills, i Ϫ ⌬p is the ex post return on 3-month Treasury bills, and ⌬m Ϫ ⌬p is the growth rate of real money balances. This specification is consistent with treating each of the four underlying variables-output, nominal interest rate, inflation, and money growth-as stationary in first differences. It also implies that the nominal interest rate and inflation are cointegrated and that nominal money growth and inflation are also cointegrated. 12 The structural shocks in the Gali (1992) model are uncovered by using the estimated reduced-form VAR representation of (6) in conjunction with various identifying restrictions. One subset of the identifying restrictions is the assumption that the structural shocks are uncorrelated. In addition, Gali (1992) considers three other sets of identifying restrictions. One set involves long-run restrictions and assumes that none of the three demand shocks has a permanent effect on the level of real output. This is sufficient for identifying the aggregate supply shock. A second set involves short-run restrictions that identify the IS shock by assuming that neither MD shocks nor MS shocks have a contemporaneous effect on real output. Last, Gali assumes that the demand for real money balances depends on real output and the nominal interest rate, but not on either inflation or the real interest rate separately. This restriction allows us to distinguish MD shocks from MS shocks. 13 Following Friedman and Kuttner (1996) , we use a rolling window procedure to obtain time-varying estimates of the variance of nominal and real shocks. Figure 4 illustrates the estimates of nominal and real uncertainty from the Gali (1992) model for the period 1969:Q2-1995:Q3. The movingaverage variances are constructed using a 5-year rolling window with equal weights. As is evident from the plots, the variances of these structural shocks do change over time, as well as relative to each other. Aggregate demand shocks became increasingly more variable in the late 1970s and early 1980s, subsequently declined, and eventually returned to levels comparable to those at the beginning of the sample period. AS shocks, on the other hand, were more variable during the early and mid-1970s, before declining and remaining fairly steady since the mid-1980s. The patterns in figure 4 also imply that the uncertainty of nominal shocks relative to real shocks rose steadily and dramatically in the middle 1970s, before the advent of a period of decline approximately a decade later.
It should not be surprising to learn that the behavior of aggregate uncertainty measures can be sensitive to the choice of methodology and variables used in their construction. This point is evident from figure 5, which depicts estimates of nominal and real uncertainty using the sliding regression technique of Wallace (1999) . As compared to our structural-based estimates, the nominal uncertainty measure in figure 5 displays a slight upward trend over the sample period. The smooth movements in the series likely reflect its inherent long-term memory process, where the estimates of uncertainty are constructed as (the square root of) a weighted average of all past squared forecast errors. 14 On the other hand, the real uncertainty measure is more variable due to the greater volatility of oil price movements. In particular, its behavior closely resembles a step function which increases during two episodes. The first episode includes the OPEC oil shocks of the 1970s, and the second episode reflects the large swings (in both directions) in oil prices observed since 1986. 15 By way of example, we will present evidence on the sensitivity of the results to these different methodologies.
B. Time-Varying Estimates of Inflation Uncertainty
Whereas theoretical work has been concerned with the effects of nominal and real uncertainty on contract length, most empirical studies have focused instead on the relationship between inflation uncertainty and contract length. As in the attempts to derive measures of nominal and real uncertainty, the lack of direct observations on inflation uncertainty has led researchers to construct various proxies for this variable.
As one approach, Christofides and Wilton (1983) and Christofides (1985 Christofides ( , 1990 ) use a sliding regression technique to generate a time-varying estimate of inflation uncertainty. Their approach can be described as follows:
where t is the inflation rate between period t Ϫ 1 and period t, X tϪ1 is a k ϫ 1 vector of explanatory variables (lagged inflation rates) available through period t Ϫ 1, ␤ tϪ1 is the coefficient vector of the model, and ε t is the error term of the model. The variable t 2 ( Sliding ), which uses data through period t, is the square of the SEE and provides the measure of uncertainty for inflation in period t ϩ 1.
Another approach is to examine survey data on price expectations. Survey data provide direct measures of inflation expectations, which circumvents possible errors in specifying how people form their forecasts. Researchers have then used the dispersion of forecasts across respondents as a proxy for the variance of inflation. 16 For example, Vroman (1989) and Kanago (1998) construct a measure of inflation uncertainty based on the cross-sectional variance of predicted price changes from the Livingston survey. This approach can be described by
where it e is individual i's forecast of inflation from the survey conducted at time t, and t e is the consensus (average) inflation forecast of the N survey respondents at time t.
14 The weights are inversely related to the number of degrees of freedom in the regression equation. This is explicitly shown by equation (7) in our subsequent discussion of the inflation uncertainty measures. 15 Because of the change in the behavior of oil prices since 1986, Hamilton (1996) argues that it is important to filter the data before constructing oil price shocks. The failure to do so will lead to residualbased estimates of oil price shocks that are overstated as well as exaggerated measures of real uncertainty. 16 There is a large empirical literature that has employed forecast dispersion measures from survey series to quantify the effect of inflation uncertainty on aggregate economic activity. It includes Cukierman and Wachtel (1979) , Levi and Makin (1980) , Mullineaux (1980 ), and Holland (1986 , 1993 . The validity of using proxies based on equation (8) depends critically on the assumption that consensus among individuals' point predictions is indicative of a high degree of predictive confidence on the their part. However, Pagan, Hall, and Trivedi (1983) and Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) argue there is little reason to believe that the degree of disagreement across point predictions should be informative about the uncertainty that individuals attach to their point predictions. Thus, the relationship between forecast dispersion and forecast uncertainty remains an open empirical question.
As an alternative to equation (8), Rich, Raymond, and Butler (1992) propose a survey-based measure of inflation uncertainty that is linked directly to the predictability of the inflation process. Drawing on the work of Engle (1982 Engle ( , 1983 , they model the conditional variance of the forecast errors of survey respondents as an autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) process. Specifically, they consider the following two-equation system to generate a time-varying measure of inflation uncertainty:
where t tϩj is the rate of inflation between period t and period t ϩ j, t e is the consensus inflation forecast from the survey conducted at time t, ε t, j is the inflation forecast error from the survey conducted in period t, I t is an information set that includes all information available through time t, and j is defined as the ratio of the forecasting horizon to the sampling interval of the survey data. 17 The key feature of the two-equation system in equation (9) is that the variable t 2 ( ARCH ) is based on the conditional variance process of the forecast errors, and thereby provides a more natural measure of inflation uncertainty from survey data on expected price changes. 18 Figure 6 illustrates estimates of inflation uncertainty for the period 1969:Q2-1995:Q3 using the three methodologies described in equations (7) to (9). The upper panel plots an estimate of CPI inflation uncertainty based on sliding regressions from an autoregressive (AR) model with three lags. To aid in the discussion, we also include a rolling variance measured with a 5-year window with equal weights. The 5-year rolling window is applied to the updated squared residuals from the sliding regressions. 17 An advantage of the formulation in equation (9) is that it can accommodate the use of overlapping data, where the forecasting horizon of the survey exceeds the sampling interval. Overlapping data results in the respondents' predictions acting as a multi-step-ahead forecast and a value of j greater than unity. Although overlapping data has no bearing on the construction of the forecast dispersion measure in equation (8), it places restrictions on the specification of the ARCH process due to informational considerations. See Rich et al. (1992) for further discussion and details on the estimation of equation (9). Kanago (1988) also proposes an ARCH-based measure of inflation uncertainty. However, he uses a reduced-form forecasting equation to model the conditional mean of the inflation process rather than a survey-based measure. 18 We model the conditional mean of inflation in equation (9) as a linear function of the consensus forecast of the survey respondents for two reasons. First, the specification does not restrict the mean of the consensus forecast errors to be 0. Second, the specification provides a normalization procedure for the purpose of estimating a conditional variance process. Consequently, the ARCH measure of inflation uncertainty does not correspond to the unadjusted (consensus) forecast errors, but rather to a bias-adjusted forecast error series based on the estimated residuals. The middle and lower panels of figure 6 depict estimates of inflation uncertainty using measures of forecast dispersion and forecast uncertainty from the Survey Research Center (SRC) expected price change series. The survey series data are quarterly observations on the 1-year CPI inflation forecasts [this implies that j ϭ 4 in equation (9)]. The measures of forecast dispersion and forecast uncertainty correspond, respectively, to the cross-sectional variance of the survey forecasts and an ARCH estimate of inflation uncertainty. 19 The ARCH specification for the 19 For the SRC survey series, Rich et al. (1992) find evidence of a statistically significant positive relationship between the cross-sectional variance of the inflation forecasts and an ARCH estimate of inflation uncertainty. Unlike Vroman (1989) and Kanago (1998) , our analysis does not employ data from the Livingston price expectations series because that conditional variance includes a constant and the fourth lagged squared residual. Figure 6 illustrates that the forecast dispersion and forecast uncertainty measures produce similar patterns over time. Specifically, both rise rather dramatically with the food and oil price shocks of 1973-1974, and then generally decline through the middle 1980s and into the early 1990s. It is interesting to note, however, that an increase in forecast uncertainty did not accompany the episode of low consensus during the latter part of the 1970s. This finding suggests that the second round of adverse supply shocks in the United States did not lead to a noticeable decline in the predictability of inflation on the part of survey respondents.
In contrast to the survey-based measures, the measure of inflation uncertainty from the sliding regression technique trends slightly upward over the bulk of the sample period. This pattern is qualitatively similar to the behavior of the nominal uncertainty measure in figure 5 and again would seem to be a consequence of the way the series is constructed. As shown more clearly by the rolling variance measure, the forecastability of inflation changed over the course of the sample period. 20 Specifically, inflation became less predictable during the first half of the sample period and then became more predictable thereafter. Because of the weighting scheme in the sliding regression technique, however, the decline in the predictability of the inflation process during the 1970s and early 1980s led to only a gradual rise in estimated uncertainty over this time period. On the other hand, the increased predictability of inflation toward the latter part of the sample only translated into a slight decline in estimated uncertainty. Taken together, the evidence in figures 5 and 6 suggests that the sliding regression technique can mask important variation in the predictability of a time series and can generate excessive smoothness in measures of uncertainty. Nevertheless, we will include this proxy for inflation uncertainty in the empirical analysis and explore its implications for the robustness of the results.
IV. Empirical Specification and Results
In this section, we discuss the additional explanatory variables that we use in estimating the econometric model outlined in section II. We begin with the BU's decision to adopt a COLA and/or a reopener clause in the current contract. We then move to the BU's decision regarding the desired duration of the contract. After discussing the explanatory variables, we summarize our empirical findings.
A. COLA and Contract Reopeners
The theoretical work on COLA clauses has not explicitly modeled the bargaining process between a union and a firm. Rather, the literature has adopted the simplifying assumption that the outcome of this bargaining will be well approximated by an optimal risk-sharing model (Ehrenberg, Danziger, and Gee, 1984; Card, 1986) . There are several predictions from this approach that have guided the empirical literature.
The starting point in the modeling process is to assume that there is a fixed cost to writing a COLA clause into the contract, which suggests that scale economies exist in the use of indexed contracts. There are a number of ways to proxy for these scale economies; we will follow the literature and control for the size of the BU (Cousineau, Lacroix, and Bilodeau, 1983; Ehrenberg et al., 1984) . 21 To the extent that the costs of writing a COLA vary by industry, the inclusion of industry fixed effects will capture this cost variation (Cousineau et al., 1983; Vroman, 1989) . National unions may develop some expertise in designing and negotiating COLA clauses, which they can pass on to their local affiliates. To allow the fixed costs of a COLA to vary by union, we also include union fixed effects in our specification. Similarly, if a BU had a COLA in its prior contract, the cost of indexing the current contract is likely to be lower. In most cases, the basic structure of the COLA is maintained between contracts. This motivates the frequent use of a lagged COLA indicator as an instrument for current indexation (Vroman, 1989; Christofides, 1990) . Gray (1976) developed a model in which the optimal degree of indexation depends on the source and behavior of shocks to the economy. In an economy with flexible wages and prices, aggregate demand shocks will not impact on the marginal product of labor and will cause spot wages to fully adjust to changes in the price level. However, AS shocks will affect the marginal product of labor and will cause spot wages to adjust only partially to changes in the price level. Indexation allows nominal wages to respond to unanticipated movements in the price level arising from aggregate demand and AS shocks. In an economy with only aggregate demand shocks, it is optimal to fully index so that real wages remain constant. 22 In an economy with only AS shocks, it is optimal to have less than full indexing so that there is an adjustment of real wages. In the general case, Gray's analysis suggests that the optimal degree of indexation is increasing in the variance of aggregate demand shocks relative to AS shocks. We will evaluate this prediction by separately controlling for nominal and real uncertainty.
Assuming that an indexed contract incorporates the optimal degree of indexation, Ehrenberg et al. (1984) show that survey is conducted on a semiannual basis and does not coincide with the quarterly frequency of our data on contract durations. 20 Because the rolling variance measure of inflation uncertainty depends on the more recent history of squared forecast errors, its movements are more responsive to changes in the predictability of the inflation process. This is also true for the ARCH measure of inflation uncertainty. the decision to adopt a COLA depends on the degree of inflation uncertainty, but not on the expected inflation rate over the next contract. Ehrenberg et al. (1984) and Murphy (1992) include both a proxy for expected inflation and inflation uncertainty to test this hypothesis. Vroman (1989) controls for the unexpected inflation rate over the prior contract and current inflation uncertainty. Cousineau et al. (1983) and Christofides (1990) control for inflation uncertainty, but not the expected inflation rate. We will include proxies for both the expected inflation rate and inflation uncertainty.
A central prediction of the risk-sharing framework is that the decision to index and the degree of indexation should depend in part on the degree of correlation between the COLA index and the firm's output and input prices. 23 Card (1986) uses a sample of Canadian contracts to test if the marginal elasticity of indexation varies with measures of both correlations. Hendricks and Kahn (1983) , Ehrenberg et al. (1984) , Christofides (1990) , and Murphy (1992) include measures of the correlation between the consumer price index and the producer price index for the firm's industry. A problem with using this control variable in our analysis is that producer price data are missing for some of the industries and years covered by our sample. Because the literature has not allowed these correlations to be time-varying, their effects will be picked up by the industry fixed effects.
Wage and price controls may affect a BU's decision to index a contract. Cousineau et al. (1983) argue that BUs have an incentive to index a contract that is expected to have an expiration date following the end of the control period. Wage increases generated by the COLA clause after the control period ends would not be subject to review. This suggests that early phases of wage/price controls should have little if any impact on the decision to index a contract, but that indexation may rise as the expectation of the cessation of controls begins to set in. Vroman (1989) , in her analysis of U.S. labor contracts, includes indicators for the Nixon and Carter control periods.
Several researchers include controls for tightness in the labor market at the time the contract was negotiated. The level of labor market aggregation used to construct these controls varies across studies. Vroman (1989) uses the aggregate unemployment rate, Christofides (1990) uses a regional unemployment rate, and Murphy (1992) uses a state unemployment rate. We follow a hybrid of these approaches by including measures of tightness in both the local labor market (measured at the state level) and the national labor market (using the firm's industry as the reference point).
We control for both trend and cyclical employment conditions in the state and industry where the BU is located. We assume that the employment process for the state or industry follows a quadratic time trend, where we allow for quarterly seasonal employment effects and up to a second-order autocorrelation in the errors. We use quarterly BLS state and national industry employment data to estimate the parameters. Letting E it denote the employment in state or industry i in period t and letting Q jt denote quarterly seasonal dummy variables, we estimate the following equation:
We proxy long-run employment trends in the state or industry by the implied employment growth rate, ␤ i1 ϩ 2␤ i2 t. The composite employment residual, it , provides a proxy for cyclical conditions in the state or industry, with tighter labor market conditions represented by positive residuals. We use the same set of control variables to model the decision to include a reopening clause in the contract. As in the case of a COLA clause, we use an indicator for a reopening clause in the prior contract. This controls for the likely reduced cost of retaining a reopening clause in the current contract relative to the initial cost of adopting the clause in an earlier contract. We expect that the presence of a reopener in the prior contract will increase the likelihood of a reopener in the current contract, because the parties are familiar with the process of negotiating under such a clause.
The coefficients of the COLA, reopening and duration specifications are jointly estimated. To aid in comparability of coefficients, we have standardized all continuous explanatory variables to have a unit standard deviation. Variable sources and summary statistics are provided in appendix B. Table 4 reports the impact of our aggregate demand and supply uncertainty proxies on the decision to index the contract with a COLA, the decision to include a scheduled reopening clause, and the desired contract duration. We first summarize the findings for the indexation and reopening decisions.
Our various proxies for the cost differences across BUs for including a COLA or a reopening clause in a contract help explain which contracts contain these provisions. A BU which had a COLA in its prior contract is much more likely to have a COLA in its current contract, which is similar to the finding in Christofides (1990) using Canadian data. Likewise, a BU which had a reopening clause in its prior contract is much more likely to have a reopening clause in its current contract. The size of the BU has a positive and significant coefficient in the COLA specification. Larger BUs, though, are no more likely to include a reopener provision in their contracts. The industry and union fixed effects are highly significant in both the COLA and the reopener specifications.
Aggregate uncertainty is an important determinant of the use of COLAs and reopenings. The data indicate that both sources of aggregate uncertainty lead to a significantly higher use of indexation and reopeners. This finding for indexation would not appear to support Gray's (1976) hypothesis that the degree of indexation should be an increasing function of the uncertainty of nominal shocks relative to that of real shocks. As shown, the standardized effect for real uncertainty is opposite in sign from Gray's prediction, and it is also larger in magnitude than the standardized effect for nominal uncertainty. It is important to note, however, that we are limited to an indirect test of Gray's hypothesis because we only observe the decision to index, and not the degree of indexation conditional on the decision to index.
Controlling more carefully for the sources of aggregate uncertainty does not eliminate the role played by expected inflation in the design of labor contracts. Specifically, we find that higher expected inflation provides further impetus for the BUs to index the contract. This result does not support the prediction from Ehrenberg et al. (1984) . The connection between expected inflation and the use of reopeners is weaker and less precisely estimated.
There is some evidence of trends and cyclicality in the use of indexation and reopening clauses. BUs that are organized in industries that experience an increase in trend employment growth are less likely to use indexed contracts, whereas BUs that are organized in states that experience an increase in trend employment are more likely to negotiate a scheduled reopening. In addition, the probability that a contract is indexed increases when employment conditions in the industry are tight. However, scheduled reopenings are less likely to be used when employment conditions in the local labor market are tight.
There is also some evidence that BUs may have used COLA clauses as a way to offset the constraints imposed by wage and price controls. Contracts negotiated during the final phases of the Nixon price controls and during the first phase of the Carter price controls were less likely to include a COLA. This reverses itself during the second phase of the Carter controls, where contracts were more likely to be indexed. If these later contracts were expected to extend beyond the cessation of the Carter controls, then this finding is consistent with the hypothesis of Cousineau et al. (1983) . In contrast, the decision to include a scheduled reopening clause in a contract does not appear to be affected by the presence of price controls.
B. The Contract Duration Decision
The Gray (1978) model suggests that two key determinants of the desired contract duration are the fixed costs of negotiating a contract and the aggregate uncertainty prevailing at the time the contact was negotiated. One difficulty in testing this hypothesis is that no direct measures of negotiation costs are available. A simple analysis of variance indicates that 15% of the variation in contract durations (treated as uncensored) is explained by a set of two-digit industry fixed effects. 24 One interpretation for this finding is that there is a strong industry-specific component to the variation in contracting costs across different BUs. 25 Several alternative proxies for contracting costs have appeared in the literature. If some of the costs of negotiating contract renewals are fixed, then there may exist important scale economies. Typically, these scale economies have been proxied by controlling for the size of the BU (Christofides and Wilton, 1983; Christofides, 1985; Vroman, 24 Adding union fixed effects to the industry fixed effects increases the explained variance of contract durations to 19%. 25 Several researchers have included in their duration specifications controls for the demographic characteristics of the union workers in a particular industry. To the extent that these vary mainly across industries or unions rather than within industries or unions over time, these demographic effects will be picked up by the industry and union fixed effects. Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. Sample size is 6,523. Continuous right-side variables have been standardized to have a zero mean and unit standard deviation. All specifications control for two-digit industry fixed effects and union fixed effects. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level.
1989). 26 To the extent that national unions provide negotiation assistance to their affiliates, there may be systematic differences in contracting costs across unions. We control for this by including a set of union fixed effects. One component of the cost of contract renewals is the associated cost of a strike if it occurs during the negotiations. Vroman (1989) controls for whether there is a strike in the current contract. She argues that a strike in the current contract will raise the likelihood of a strike in the subsequent contract renewal, thereby increasing the expected costs associated with the current contract. This would suggest that, all else constant, the parties should agree to a longer contract. However, Schnell and Gramm (1987) examine U.S. data and find that the probability of a strike declines with the incidence of a strike in the prior contract negotiation. Card (1988) and Cramton, Gunderson, and Tracy (1999) examine Canadian data and find that the impact of a current strike on the likelihood of a strike at the next negotiation varies with the length of the current strike. Short strikes (less than 28 days) are associated with a higher strike incidence at the contract renewal, whereas long strikes (more than 50 days) are associated with a lower strike incidence at the contract renewal. Thus, there is no clear connection between the occurrence of a strike in the current and subsequent contract negotiations.
The other key aspect to test in the Gray (1978) model is the role of uncertainty in labor contract durations. We will follow Wallace and Blanco (1991) and Wallace (1999) , who attempt to control for both nominal and real uncertainty. Drawing upon the previous analysis in section III, we will employ our structuralbased measures of aggregate nominal and real uncertainty. We can then determine if the effects of aggregate uncertainty on contract durations depend on the source of the uncertainty as suggested by Danziger (1988) . Later we compare the nominal and real uncertainty results with those using a variety of proxies for inflation uncertainty. Christofides (1985) argues that the desired contract duration depends on whether the contract is negotiated during a period of wage and price controls. If the controls are expected to lapse in the near future, then an incentive exists for the parties to negotiate a shorter contract. If this shorter contract expires following the end of the controls, then at the contract renewal the BU can reset the wage terms without the constraints imposed by the controls. Christofides (1985) tests this prediction using Canadian contract data, and Vroman (1989) and Wallace and Blanco (1991) test it using U.S. contract data.
We also control for conditions in the industry and local labor markets. As discussed earlier, we control for changes in trend employment growth in the industry and state, as well as for the degree to which current employment in the industry and state is above or below its trend. Vroman (1989) controls for the overall tightness in the labor market using the aggregate unemployment rate. Murphy (1992) controls for the employment growth rate in the BU's industry in the year prior to the contract renewal.
The impact of aggregate nominal and real uncertainty on contract durations is reported in the last column of table 4. Consistent with the Gray (1978) model and in contrast to the predictions from Danziger (1988) , we find that both uncertainty measures are associated with significantly shorter contract durations. Moreover, the standardized real uncertainty effect is 50% larger than the standardized nominal uncertainty effect. This does not support the view that BUs use the contract duration as a risk-sharing mechanism. Controlling for aggregate nominal and real uncertainty, we observe an insignificant inverse relation between the level of expected inflation and desired contract durations.
Our results contrast with those of Wallace (1999) , who uses a sliding regression technique to obtain time-varying measures of nominal and real uncertainty. In a sample of manufacturing contracts ending in 1980, he finds that contract durations have a positive and significant connection with real uncertainty, and a negative and significant connection with nominal uncertainty. When we adopt the approach of Wallace (1999) and incorporate the corresponding measures of real and nominal uncertainty into our sample and specification, we find that both measures of aggregate uncertainty have a positive and significant effect on contract durations. Further investigation into these results is beyond the scope of this paper, but the observed positive impact of nominal uncertainty on contract durations seems particularly difficult to interpret theoretically. This finding raises further concern about the sliding regression technique and the reliability of the nominal and real uncertainty measures based on this methodology.
Our data permit an additional test of the risk-sharing hypothesis. Holding the size of the BU constant, we check for whether BUs which have experienced membership declines over the prior contract period prefer longer contracts. The hypothesis is that BUs faced with recent membership declines will have a stronger preference for job security protections to be written into the current contract. This gives the union an incentive to negotiate for a longer contract in order to extend the life of these job protections. Looking at the data, we find some evidence that membership declines do prompt BUs to negotiate longer contracts.
Scheduled reopening provisions appear to offer BUs more contract flexibility than do COLA provisions. BUs that build in contract flexibility through scheduled reopening provisions have contracts with durations that are around 6 months longer than others'. Indexing a contract only appears to increase the desired contract duration by around 2 1 2 months. Vroman (1989) also finds that COLAs extend the desired duration by around 2 1 2 months. Murphy (1992) , in contrast, estimates a COLA effect of 9 to 12 months.
We find considerable support for the fixed-cost determinants of contract durations. The industry and union fixed effects are jointly significant. In addition, we find that larger BUs tend to negotiate longer contracts. This is consistent with the view that the fixed costs associated with negotiating labor contracts significantly increase with the size of the BU. Following up on Vroman's (1989) idea of controlling for likely strike costs, when we add an indicator for a short strike in the current contract negotiation, it has a negative and insignificant effect.
Desired contract durations also vary with cyclical and trend conditions in the industry and local labor markets. BUs organized in states and industries that have experienced increases in trend employment growth tend to negotiate shorter contracts, with the industry trend effect dominating the local labor market trend effect in magnitude. However, when cyclical conditions in the industry are tight, the BU tends to negotiate a longer contract. Cyclical conditions in the local labor market do not appear to exert any significant influence on the desired contract duration.
Finally, there is some evidence that BUs shorten up contracts during the later phases of wage and price controls. Vroman (1989) reports lower contract durations in her sample for both the Nixon and Carter control periods, with the strongest effects occurring during the Nixon phases III and IV. Although our data suggest that contracts negotiated during phases III and IV of the Nixon controls and both phases of the Carter controls were shorter, the effect is significant only during the second phase of the Carter controls. Here the data indicate that desired contract durations were shorter by around a month and a half.
Unobserved heterogeneity among our BUs is well captured by a simple discrete distribution with two points of support. The heterogeneity parameter estimates indicate that 5% of the BUs have labor contracts that are 8 months longer than we would otherwise predict. These BUs are also less likely to incorporate a COLA in their contracts. Finally, the magnitude of the reopening effect suggests that these BUs never use reopeners. 27
C. Inflation Uncertainty
With the exceptions of Wallace and Blanco (1991) and Wallace (1999) , empirical investigations into the effect of uncertainty on contract length have restricted their attention to inflation uncertainty (Christofides & Wilton, 1983; Christofides, 1985; Vroman, 1989; Murphy, 1992) . We will now consider the three alternative proxies for inflation uncertainty previously discussed in section III. The analysis will focus not only on the estimated relationship between contract durations and inflation uncertainty, but also on the extent to which this relationship is sensitive to the methodology used to measure inflation uncertainty. We carry out this exercise holding constant both the data and the underlying econometric specification. Table 5 presents the results when we modify the specifications to include different measures of expected inflation and inflation uncertainty. For ease of presentation and to conserve space, we only focus on the effects associated with these particular variables. The results pertaining to the indexation decision and the adoption of a reopening clause are given in the upper panel, and the contract duration results in the lower panel.
The evidence indicates that the effect of inflation uncertainty on labor contracts differs across the various proxies. The forecast dispersion and ARCH measures of inflation uncertainty using the SRC expected price change data provide consistent results. Both measures indicate that there is a greater likelihood that contracts will be indexed or will contain a scheduled reopener during periods of heightened inflation uncertainty, the former results being consistent with those of Cousineau et al. (1983) , Ehrenberg et al. (1984), and Christofides (1990) . There is also evidence that contracts are shorter during periods of heightened inflation uncertainty. The effects of inflation uncertainty on contract durations are more precisely estimated when we use the ARCH measure.
We obtain sharply contrasting results when we use the sliding regression methodology to construct the proxy for inflation uncertainty. According to this measure, periods of increased inflation uncertainty are associated with less indexing, less use of scheduled reopeners, and longer contracts (although this last effect is not statistically significant). 28 With regard to the reliability of the inflation uncertainty measures, we can offer some additional insight by drawing upon our previous analysis of the impact of aggregate nominal and real uncertainty on contract durations. Specifically, the results in table 4 indicate that both nominal and real uncertainty exert a negative and significant effect on contract durations. If each measure is assumed to be positively associated with inflation uncertainty, then we would predict an unambiguous negative impact of inflation uncertainty on contract durations. 29 Although Table 5 provides support for this prediction using the survey-based measures of inflation uncertainty, the sliding regression technique generates an anomalous positive impact of inflation uncertainty on contract durations. This finding offers additional evidence that uncertainty measures based on the sliding regression methodology may be problematic. 27 We fixed this parameter in the final round of estimation because the optimizer wanted to continue to increase its value, which made estimating its standard error difficult. 28 Kanago (1988) also concludes that inferences about the behavior of labor contracts are sensitive to the choice of inflation uncertainty measures. He analyzes the effects of various inflation proxies on contract durations in a sample of 1,000 large contracts expiring during the period from 1954 to 1980. He finds that an ARCH measure of inflation uncertainty is positively related to contract lengths, whereas a sliding regression measure of inflation uncertainty and the mean squared forecast error from the SRC expected price change series are negatively related to contract durations. 29 This prediction implicitly assumes that our measures of nominal and real uncertainty are reasonable. Abstracting from this consideration, we performed a cursory investigation into the relationship of inflation uncertainty to nominal and real uncertainty. Specifically, we regressed each of the survey-based measures of inflation uncertainty on the structural-based measures of aggregate demand and aggregate supply uncertainty. The results indicated that the forecast dispersion measure of inflation uncertainty is positively and statistically significantly related to both aggregate nominal and real uncertainty. We obtained similar results in the case of the ARCH inflation uncertainty measure, although the estimated coefficient on aggregate nominal uncertainty was not statistically significant.
A mixed picture emerges for the role of expected inflation on the decision to include a COLA or a reopening clause in the current contract. In two of the three specifications, we observe a significant positive relationship between expected inflation and the decision to include a COLA. As with the results reported in table 4, there is no evidence indicating that expected inflation is an important consideration for the decision to include a scheduled reopening clause.
A prediction from some models is that after controlling for the uncertainty over future inflation, the expected inflation rate should have no independent influence on contract durations. The impact of the expected inflation rate on the desired duration is again sensitive to how we control for inflation uncertainty. When we use the forecast dispersion measure from the SRC survey, the expected rate of inflation has no impact on the desired contract duration. However, when we use the sliding regression technique or the ARCH measure of inflation uncertainty, periods of higher expected inflation are associated with shorter contracts.
V. Conclusions
Theoretical models of contract duration generate competing predictions about the impact of uncertainty on contract length. The models of Gray (1978) and Canzoneri (1980) predict that increased uncertainty-regardless of sourcewill shorten contract durations, whereas Danziger (1988) suggests that increased real uncertainty may lengthen contracts on account of risk-sharing considerations. Empirical studies, however, have not settled this debate and have largely failed to establish any consistent evidence about the role of uncertainty in shaping contract durations. This outcome largely reflects the widespread differences across studies in sample periods, selected countries, measures of contract duration, econometric procedures, and construction of explanatory variables. Moreover, the empirical literature has typically shown a disconnect from theory by focusing on inflation uncertainty.
We provide a direct test of the competing hypotheses concerning the relationship between uncertainty and contract durations by using a structural identification of aggregate demand and supply shocks. In particular, we follow the approach of Gali (1992) to construct estimates of aggregate nominal and real uncertainty and use these measures as the key variables of interest for the empirical analysis. Consistent with Gray's (1978) model, we find that both sources of aggregate uncertainty have a significant negative relationship with contract durations. Taken together, this evidence suggests that labor contract durations are endogenous to the economic environment prevailing at the time they are negotiated, but that risk-sharing concerns are not paramount.
We also contribute to the existing literature by investigating the relationship between inflation uncertainty and contract length. To investigate the effect of inflation uncertainty on contract durations, we consider three different proxies for inflation uncertainty while holding fixed the empirical specification and set of contract negotiations. We find a negative and significant relationship between contract durations and inflation uncertainty when we use proxies based on measures of forecast dispersion and forecast uncertainty from the SRC expected price change series. We also consider a popular proxy for inflation uncertainty based on a sliding regression technique. In contrast to the previous results, we find this measure produces several anomalous results, and that it appears to be ill suited as a proxy for inflation uncertainty.
durations to depend on indexation and reopening clauses and vice versa. Our specification only allows the duration decision to depend on the presence or absence of indexation and/or reopening clauses. There is no feedback between the desired contract duration and the decisions to include these clauses in the contract. The rationale for this restriction is detailed below. Heckman (1978) discusses the following general framework:
where the y variables are potentially unobserved latent variables, and the x variables are assumed to be exogenous. Heckman shows that this is a valid statistical framework if and only if ␥ 2 ␤ 1 ϩ ␤ 2 ϭ 0. Consider a simplified version of our model. Ignoring the issue of censoring of some contract durations and the presence of reopening provisions, we can write our basic specification using Heckman's framework:
Here we assume that the contract duration is observed.
Consider first the contract duration equation. In the general framework, both the presence of a COLA clause and the underlying latent variable affecting the indexation decision are allowed to influence the contract duration decision. In this specific application, it is reasonable to allow the presence of a COLA to affect the length of a contract, for it provides additional flexibility (␤ 1 0). However, there is little reason to believe that variation in the latent variable C* would have any independent influence on the contract duration (␥ 1 ϭ 0).
Turn now to the specification of the latent variable governing the indexation decision. There is little justification in this context to assume that a COLA clause would shift the latent variable C*. This suggests that we set ␤ 2 ϭ 0. Heckman's restriction is that ␥ 2 ␤ 1 ϩ ␤ 2 ϭ 0. For this restriction to be satisfied, we drop D from the equation (set ␥ 2 ϭ 0). Inflation is measured as the quarterly growth (at an annual rate) in the consumer price series PCU. The sliding regressions are initially estimated using a sample covering the period 1966:Q2-1969:Q3.
APPENDIX B
Data Definitions and Sources
Expected inflation
The expected inflation series is computed according to equation (7), where the conditional mean of the inflation process is specified as an AR(3) process. 5.79 2.96
Inflation uncertainty
The inflation uncertainty measure is computed according to equation (7) as the square of the standard error of the estimate. 3.86 0.46
B. The Survey Research Center (SRC) Expected Price Change Series
The SRC survey is conducted at the University of Michigan and actually begins in 1948, but has undergone changes in both the sampling interval and the form of the survey questionnaire. We restrict our attention to post-1966:Q2 data, because that quarter corresponds to a transition in the survey to complete closed-end quantitative data. In addition, the survey made a transition from quarterly data to monthly data in 1977. Therefore, we examine data corresponding to the months of February, May, August and November to maintain consistency in the dates of the surveys. Further details on the SRC survey series are provided in Juster and Comment (1980) and Rich et al. (1992) .
Expected inflation
Measures of expected inflation are forecasts of CPI inflation over the next four quarters. 6.08 2.13
Inflation uncertainty-forecast dispersion measure
The forecast dispersion measure is computed according to equation (8) as the cross-sectional variance of the inflation forecasts. 56.86 23.64
Inflation uncertainty-ARCH measure 3.42 2.07 The inflation uncertainty measure is computed according to equation (9) . The forecast error is constructed as the residual from a regression of the annual rate of change in the consumer price series PCU on a constant and the consensus inflation forecast. The ARCH specification includes the fourth lagged squared forecast error and is estimated using data from the 1968:Q2-1995:Q3 surveys.
C. Gali (1992) Model All data are quarterly, and the estimation is conducted over the sample period 1959:Q1-1995:Q4.
Output
The output series GDPH is measured as real gross domestic product in chain-weighted 1992 dollars.
Prices
The price data are a quarterly average of the monthly consumer price series PCU for all urban consumers. 
Interest rates
The interest rate data are a quarterly average of the monthly series FTBS3, which represents the yield on 3-month Treasury bills.
Money stock
The data on the money stock are for M1 and are a quarterly average of the series FM1. The measures of M1 prior to 1959 are taken from the Federal Reserve Bulletin.
Aggregate real and nominal uncertainty
The measure of real uncertainty is computed as a rolling variance of the aggregate supply shock with a 5-year window with equal weights. The measure of nominal uncertainty is computed as a rolling variance of a composite aggregate demand shock with a 5-year window with equal weights. 
